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In 1986 Inkatha organized a May Day rally at King's Park Stadium in Durban, to show 
the world that it still controlled the destiny of Natal's black working people. 
During this mass gathering, UWUSA - Inkatha's alternative to COSATU and the Zulu 
movement's ideological echo on such principles as disinvestment, fiee enterprise and 
moderation - was launched. This gesture for both COSATU and UUNSA marked a test of 
strength with very serious implications for Natal. Most prominent in many people's 
minds was a harsh and vexed question: Was the cradle of South Africa's democratic 
and socialist labour movement about to turn into its graveyard? 
Chief Buthelezi descended into the stadium on "his bird of ironf', a 
helicopter, with UWUSA slogans draped over it. He was greeted by the roar of close 
to 70,000 people gathered from all corners of Natal, KwaZulu and beyond. He was 
also greeted by an array of banners rejecting disinvestment, chastising Bishop Tutu 
for his stance on such issues and proclaiming the death of COSATU. And from the 
raised stage he was treated to a theatrical burial: members of his youth league, 
led by Inkatha's formidable warlord Shabalala, carried a coffin bearing COSATU's, 
Barayi's and Naidu's names to its dramatic "grave". The rally's success was 
appreciated by the media, for it confirmed their most secret hopes and aspirations: 
a demonstration of Inkatha's hegemony which was successful enough to seal the fate 
of the region. It also allowed the media to down-play the national May Day stpppage 
called by COSATU, the UDF and others, which was heeded by 1.5 million workers. It 
certainly overshadowed COSATUfs own rally at Durban's Curries Fountain, which 
attracted approximately 10,000 people, or the total of 28,000 gathered to mark the 
day at COASTU rallies throughout Natal. As an Inkatha worker-leader asserted, "it 
showed COSATU and all the others that 2 e  Zulu nation is angry and hungry .:it has 
had enou& of their terroristic ideas". 
May Day was surprisingly peaceful, considering that it was the culmination 
of a nine-month "war1' between Inkatha, its support-bases and the trade unions. This 
followed after the trail of an older "war" or "hun5" between Inkatha supporters, the 
UDF and youth congress militants in the townships. By September 1985 INYANDA, the 
shopkeeperst association affiliated to Inkatha, declared "war" on FOSATU in order to 
break the drive by unions for a consumer boycott of white shops in Natal. In 
November 1985, as delegates gathered for the launch of COSATU in Durban, Chief 
Buthelezi attacked the emergent federatian as a "front" for the "ANC-mission-in- 
exile1', set up primarily to destroy him. The federation's elected resident, B Elijah Barayi, retorted a day later by attacking "homeland puppetsf'. Loud-hailers 
up and down township streets, radio stations and newspapers, from then on declared a 
war of words against COSATU, whilst silently and away from the public eye Inkatha 
supporters carried out a physical war in the townships. In the process, a skilful 
construction of a "scapegoat" occurred: the "front" made up of UDF, COSATU and 
hordes of unruly, criminal youths were trying to create ungovernability, rioting and 
destruction and fo~ce their solutions by guns and by fire; it pointed to the 
violence of the Zondo and (later) the Macbride bombings that killed innocent people 
and that increased racial hatred and tensions; it pointed to the looting and 
rioting of August and September 1985 around Durban; it pointed to the "ne~klace*~ 
executions; it pointed to the lyrics of songs and at the revolutionary rhetoric of 
strikers; it pointed to the insulting attacks on the Inkatha leadership. This was 
an orchestrated campaign by the ANC mission-in-exile. Inkatha was left, the 
argume t went, with l i t t l e  choice but  t o  defend i t s e l f  against  these ttnothingsw i n  8 Natal. Finally,  the  formation of UWUSA was jus t i f i ed  a s  p a r t  and parcel  of such a 
defence policy: t o  provide a responsible t rade  union a l t e rna t ive  f o r  the  black 
working class.  
Simon Conco, a northern Natal businessman and KwaZulu MP, announced 
UWUSA's formation a t  Johannesburg's Carlton Hotel. He w a s  t o  become the  union's 
general secretary. Sicefe Gumede, a d i s sa t i s f i ed  FOSATU shop-steward and township 
council lor ,  a l so  from northern Natal, w a s  t o  become its nat ional  organizer. Before 
long Richards Bay, Empangeni, Isi thebe,  Newcastle, and Ladysmith workers were 
approached, bussed around, talked t o ,  t o  leave COSATU and join UWUSA. 
The Zulu Royal House was brought i n t o  the conf l i c t  a s  well, with King 
Zewlethini at tacking COASTU on its pro-sanctions stance. He went fu r the r  still t o  
question Barayi's r i g h t  t o  meddle, a s  a Xhosa, i n  the a f f a i r s  of the  Zulu people. 
Pamphlets appeared i n  Newcastle, reducing COSATU in to  a Xhosa-Indian p l o t  against  
the  Zulu people; i n  the  south, where bloody clashes between Pondo and Zulu people 
had occurred only months before, such rumours became the order of  the  day. Township 
councillors, faced with such an obvious th rea t  on Zulu l i f e ,  vowed t o  r i d  t h e i r  
townships of COSATU members. There followed attacks,  shootings and burnings a s  
houses were gutted, and many COSATU leaders suffered. But attempts t o  l u r e  people 
away from t h e i r  t r ad i t iona l  unions were more d i f f i c u l t  than i n i t i a l l y  suspected, 
even i n  northern Zululand, an obvious Inkatha stronghold. A s  the grassroots 
campaign was intensifying,  Inkatha a l so  aimed high: it decided t o  demonstrate how 
it could appropriate May Day with t h e  maximum of humdrum. I f  the  crowds were there,  
the  media would do the r e s t :  they would turn  UWUSA i n t o  a household name and make 
it the  economic hope f o r  Natal 's homesteads. 
Despite Inkatha's symbolic victory,  soc ia l  c r i t i c s  of the  Zulu movement 
ins i s t ed  t h a t  the  r a l l i e s  were not adequate measures of worker support o r  strength. 
Rather, UWUSA's launch was the  r e s u l t  of a well orchestrated campaign which poured 
tens of thousands of confused r u r a l  people, under the tu te lage  of  chiefs ,  i n t o  
Durban's stadium. And, they added, COSATU's r a l l i e s  would have been l a rge r ,  had the  
s t a t e  and Inkatha stopped enveloping the  townships i n  layers  and l ayers  of f e a r  and 
trepidation. Of course, the  campaign f o r  the  launch of UWUSA was very well 
orchestrated and the  fears  enveloping the townships were well founded: they almost 
appeared t o  be p a r t  and parcel  of  such campaigning, as prominent worker leaders were 
targeted: Jeffrey Vilane, M A W U t s  president and a northern Natal shop-steward, was 
attacked, shot  a t ,  injured,  and h i s  house gutted; Thami Mohlome, COSATUts Natal 
secretary,  had h i s  house attacked and shot a t ;  and many more union members were 
harassed or  assaulted. Furthermore, since March, Inkatha's branches, homeland 
chiefs,  members of the  KLA, the homeland bureaucracy, church congregations, and the  
royal  house had been mobilizing with t o t a l  dedication f o r  the  event. Nevertheless, 
two re la ted  assumptions a r e  unfounded: t h a t  Inkathats support is t o  be found only 
i n  the  r u r a l  areas,  and t h a t  Natal 's and KwaZulu's r u r a l  population can be gathered 
l i k e  potatoes i n t o  a sack t o  be poured out i n t o  Durban's stadium. 
It is ins t ruct ive ,  then, t o  spend some time looking a t  t h i s  mobilization, 
s t a r t i n g  from the  countryside. King Zwelethini i n i t i a t e d  the  c a l l  f o r  mobilization, 
through a broadcast t o  the  "Zulu Nationtt which urged t'histl subjects t o  support 
UWUSA's launch. Thereafter, chief  a f t e r  chief  was put i n  f r o n t  of a microphone t o  
c a l l  upon " thei r t t  people t o  at tend the  r a l l y .  I f  it was l e f t  t o  a simple broadcast, 
the question of attendance would have remained an issue of individual choice. But, 
a s  the  LMG found out ,  it was backed by r u r a l  organization. A l l  the  chiefs  of the 
KLA were instructed,  through a c i rcu la r ,  t o  mobilize 4 bus-loads each f o r  the  r a l l y .  
Over and above t h a t ,  people had t o  t r ave l  by t r a i n s  running f o r  f r e e  on the  main 
a r t e r i e s  t o  Durban, especial ly provided f o r  the  occasion. I n  s i x  of the  nine areas 
surveyed by the LMG, a common c a l l  prevailed: the population was to ld  t h a t  people 
from overseas wanted t o  take t h e i r  money away from South Africa and were supported 
i n  t h i s  by some misguided p o l i t i c a l  organizations. This would imply a tremendous 
loss  of jobs, and t o  counter t h a t  Chief Buthelezi was ca l l ing  on h i s  people t o  
at tend the  r a l l y  t o  show the  whole world t h a t  they opposed such moves. In  a l l ,  s i x  
area chiefs  sent  t h e i r  headmen t o  t h e i r  respective wards and homesteads t o  urge 
people t o  at tend the r a l l i e s ,  and i n  three  of these homeland police ass i s t ed  by 
delivering l e t t e r s  door t o  door. But, even if a l l  the chiefs  did t h e i r  job 
effectively, a maximum of only 26,000 people could be "sacked" and delivered. Yet, 
according to the LMG, only in five out of the nine areas was the instruction 
executed and people were bussed. 
Nevertheless, a sizeable rural crowd of people responded then to the KLA's 
and the Chief's calls. Furthermore, they were not exactly told the reasons for the 
Durban invasion. Whether they arrived voluntarily or not, or through fear of 
sanctions by headmen or the KwaZulu administration, it is very difficult to assess. 
What the LMG could do was to assess roughly the areas of supply of this large crowd: 
the highest volume of buses (80-100) came from northern/coastal Zululand, led by 
dignitaries like Prince Gideon Zulu and township councillors. Another 40 came from 
the Ladysmith and Newcastle areas, drawn primarily from relocated squatter camps and 
reserve homesteads. According to the Ubumbulu chiefs Mkhize and Makhanya, 
approximately 4,000 people, led by themselves and the feared councillor Mbongwe, 
arrived by buses too. That is, about half of the crowd almost certainly came from 
outside Durban, but, apart from rural people, it was also made up of the proletariat 
of the border industrial areas and the shack-settlements all over KwaZulu. Finally, 
allowing for those who resided in the hostels and in company compounds in Durban, we 
are still left with a very large crowd that could only have come from Durban's 
townships. 
It is important to understand, then, that large numbers of people gathered 
from far and near because their attitudes to Inkatha and other organizations had 
been forged, whether by fiat or fortitude, by a complex history which had gone awry 
in the last two blazing years. Again, through loud hailers, the radio, through 
passers-by, from the pulpit, or through direct experience, attitudes were galvanized 
into convictions. For example, an 80-year old farm labourer, who is also one of the 
best known lay-prechers from Qatalamba (Drakensberg) to Mooi River, has been 
collecting attitudes and opinions which he now translates into sermons against the 
evil that has befallen Zulu people. Dieinvestment frightened him: "If the white 
man left us now, how would we make steel? Even a shirt, or a spoon or eat? And as 
for a car where you move and you're sitting down, a table, an axe, even manure, we 
don't know how to make these things." Furthermore, his congregation and farm- 
workers in the area have been rocked by the union struggles in and around Howick, 
led by Sarmcol workers and MAWU. For him, all this was anathema: "They spoiled 
people at work, a lot of people have suffered on account of unions. The families 
suffer more now and the people don't eat ... This last year, it all went wrong, it's 
the union that makes the people fight at the factory and the children at home don't 
eat. These unions are all new, we always hear on the radio about unions, and the 
children who refuse to go to school, they destroy their schools, they don't learn 
well any more ...lg The shift from the curse of the union to children and youth 
struggles is crucial because, in this remarkable worker's mind, they represent a 
fundamental violation of the I1Zulu way of life", of "culture1' and of 'luhlaphanisa": 
that is, the discipline and respect of younger generations to the commands to 
elders. And he continues: "The worst thing now is crime among the children, young 
children carrying guns, I don't know how they get hold of them ... Now they kill 
each other with them ... We at home see that it's these town people that learnt all 
this crime, and now they bring guns back into the farms. I suspect the townspeople 
are guilty of this ... And in the locations people shoot each other. And in the 
schools they learn horrible things, like putting a tyre on somebody and burning them 
with petrol ...l1 And in this horrific world only one solution remained: "By Zulu 
law, if you committed a crime once, you must be killed. These criminals 05 now 
would have been killed in Shaka's day ... We must show them Shakals rage." 
These attitudes can be multiplied further afield - for example, a worker 
from northern Natal who had worked in the fields as a cane-cutter for twenty years 
before he was promoted to a mill worker, where he still works after ten years, 
concurs with the fears of the old man mentioned above. He adds to that a fear of 
the anti-Christ, the fear of a communist plot - a plot that has swallowed his 
brother at a metal factory in Durban, and since then his brother has been villifying 
the Chief and he heaps insults on the Zulu nation. Or a shop-steward from further 
south at Tongaat Mill who will not desert his Inkatha union in the sugar industry 
despite his knowledge of corruption in the organization, because it would insult his 
leadership. This worker actively participated in physically "chasing1' the UDF out 
of his township. Or, further south still, the workers from the shack worlds of 
Ubumbulu who, led by their chiefs MaWlanya and Mkhize (who are fighting each other 
most of the time) are COSATU members but who, after bloody confrontations, got their 
areas rid of Pondo workers because, among other things, they were UDF members who 
spread evil influences among Zulu youth. As both their chiefs asserted, l8Shaka's 
blood runs through our veins". Or, the Pondo spiritual guide of the 'sEmakehlenits 
church near KwaMashu, which embodies a "nativist" revival and argues that black 
people have lost themselves because they lost Shaka's way - a way bequeathed to the 
blacks as Gandhi's way was bequeathed to the Indians and Christ's way to the whites. 
Or, one of the worker leaders of the early '70s who had just retired from the 
factory floor but who was a SACTU, an ANC, and now an Inkatha activist who believes 
in the progressive role of trade unions. What is pertinent here is to depart from 
naive beliefs about the llcaptivesl nature of the audience at King's Park. The UWUSA 
and COSATU confrontation marked.a high point of tensions which reverberated with 
ethnic, natio a1 and populist rhetoric stirred together with strong echoes of class 
organization. 8 
But, if the gathering for some was a defence of ancestral Zulu pride or a 
demonstration of lfShaka's rage", it was nevertheless a sleek and modernist affair, 
as strict discipline was exercised by KwaZulu police armed with semi-automatic 
rifles and batons. The crowds were ushered into their seats and they were 
discouraged from singing and chanting by the impersonal happenings on the platform, 
which included a band playing smooth soul/funk music and endless English speeches. 
The meeting was nothing like most political meetings in South Africa or Natal, with 
their explosive popular participation in singing, saluting and sloganizing. Nor was 
it allowed to develop into the carnival-like vibrancy that Inkatha's "Shaka daystt 
are known for. It was, rather, a public spectacle, stage-managed for the 
international press and the media. Even Buthelezi's marathon speech to the nation 
was delivered in English. The only exceptions were youth-league members parading 
outside the stadium with raucous aplomb, and inside a jubilant group of hostel 
workers waving their sticks and chanting for a good half an hour, unperturbed by the 
proceedings. 
And there to witness the birth of this I'giantt1 was Natal's new power 
alliance: the sugarocracy, Natal's industrialists and commercial giants, liberal 
politicians, AFL-C10 representatives and foreign consuls. And without prior 
discussion the executive of UWUSA was appointed: it was to be headed by black 
businessmen, a hotel owner, two industrial relations officers, a townsh 
superintendent, and two workers, one of whom was a township councillor. @ 
In contrast, COSATU's rally at Curries Fountain was a more "archaic" and 
more militant event. Its crowd was a seething body of energy: workers with their 
banners and slogans comprised the overwhelming majority; the rest was almost 
exclusively made up of youth with their toyi-toyi rhythms and jogging marches. The 
platform was dominated by a red and gold COSATU banner and in front of it Samuel 
Mthethwa, a worker leader from the Dunlop factory, led the crowds with his gruff 
Zulu voice the way he had led both workers and youth in mass meetings and strike 
gatherings for the last two years. And the oral poets Hlatshwayo, Qabula and 
Ramaekgele, but especially the first, got the crowds roaring with their vernacular 
incantations to the "diggers of the nation's wealth/Machine operators/Moulders of 
ores and of tyre/ ... Sons of Dlambe and Madlanduna/Children of Bambatha and 
Makhana/of Mshweshwe and Soshanganel' ... but also comrades of "J B Marks and Neil 
Agget/Mabheda and Phungula ... Raditsela and Mahlangu"; and also praises of their 
"noble traditions/traditions wovf~ and knitted together in courage/traditions born 
to your skills of perseverencefl. Cultural activities encompassed traditional 
dancing and choir work. Owing to joint organization, the UDF shared much of the 
platform's speeches together with COSATUfs executive. 
The COSATU rally in Pietermaritzburg was also attended by about 10,000 
people but it was primarily composed of township youth and a smaller contingent of 
workers, whereas the Ladysmith and Esikhaweni rallies, which occurred in defiance of 
state prohibition and Inkatha threats, attracted another 6,000 people who were 
overwhelmingly workers. Although the Durban and Pietermaritzburg platforms 
displayed an organizational alliance between the UDF and COSATU, the social 
composition of the crowds out there in the midst of potential violence was made up 
of workers and youths. The rest of the black community either went to the Inkatha 
rallies or stayed away. 
Mthethwa and many other worker leaders felt very vulnerable that day: 
"there were threats of violence everywhere ... violence could have started at the 
bus-stops, at the train-stations, in the town as Dunlop and Clover workers gathered 
at their factories to march to Curries Fountain, in the hostels as the hostel 
workers were divided about whom to support, at the docks, and hotheads could have 
tried to raid the meetings. If something happened anywhere it would have been the 
biggest bloodshed in the history we know. All I aimed for is to get through the 
day, that Is all, get through the day. By the evening, when we he&d that a youth 
was shot by a councillor on the way to Umlazi I felt weak. I realised that getting 
through the day was not enough. I had to get through two ffre days until after the 
funeral. And that is how it went on and on from then on." 
The next Sunday Umlazi was a time-bomb. Most people locked themselves 
inside their houses as large numbers of CASSPIRS and military vans patrolled the 
streets, ready for the youth's funeral. The councillor responsible for the shooting 
was alleged to have been moving around town taking shots at people gathering for the 
burial. Rumours abounded that the Amabutho were mobilizing for an attack on the 
crowd. The crowd was very small, about three hundred people, mainly youths. A 
small worker-leader delegation stood there worried that they were being pushed by 
events into the forefront of a Itwarn they never imagined possible: that they were 
being grouped by unfolding events with the youth movement of Natal - the barefoot 
comrade brigades. They wfse the "nothings" Chief Buthelezi threatened with the 
unleashing of Zulu anger. 
From that day onwards, a tremendous conflict exploded inside the townships 
between Inkatha, its "amabutho" and youth, or "comrades1' - and alongside this a 
remarkable clash on the ground between workers for and against COSATU. Somebody 
like Mthethwa has not slept in his little room in Umlazi for a year and a half as 
four times gunmen came to "visit" him. He has also attended 36 funerals. But what 
was completely unexpected was the ferocity of resistance by comrades in the 
townships. Also their dramatic growth as a politico-cultural movement even in the 
strongest of Inkatha territories: from Ladysmith to Umbumbulu. The bloodshed has 
been extensive as in all the townships explosive confrontations were developed. In 
the process, both Inkatha and UWUSA were emasculated at certain fundamental levels: 
through the actions of its warlords Inkatha became incapable of mobilizing voluntary 
support in the townships for its "battles"; it also lost the capacity of mobilizing 
in most of Durban's hostels. Rather, Inkatha was forced to move away from the 
politics of hegemony to the politics of control: it had to rely more on paid 
amabutho drawn from the lumpenproletariat or the services of the KwaZulu police. 
Furthermore, its UWUSA strategy failed to proselytize significant numbers of workers 
in Natal. The unproblematic link between wZulu-nessw and Inkatha has been broken, 
and this breaking has not only involved people who have understood the Zulu movement 
to be a narrow, particularistic, tribal, ethnic movement, but also by Zulu 
Itnationaliststt who feel they have been betrayed. 
May Day 1987 was prohibited by a state well into its second state of 
emergency. This time Inkatha and UWUSA did not even bother to organize anything. 
COSATU also decided to abandon the holding of rallies; but worker leadership and 
youth unperturbed went on to hold three smaller ones: at the Umlazi cinema, at a 
church in Lamontville, and at the trade union offices in Pinetown. Mthethwa once 
again chaired the first two in his gruff Zulu voice, still without a home and still 
hoping to make it through another day. For him, the link between ttZulu-nessl' and 
Inkatha, an organization he joined in 1976, has been broken; so has the belief that 
Inkatha contains within it the seeds of the politics of national redemption and 
liberation. 
Mthethwa's predicament and working l i f e ,  although unique, a r e  a t  the same time 
commonplace i n  Durban's indus t r i a l  l i f e .  A s  a recent survey of shop-steward 
leadership i n  Durban showed, most worker leaders were l i k e  him: migrant workers who 
res ide  a s  tenants, renting rooms, i n  township houses. They had a l l  l e f t  behind 
them, i n  the  countryside, both homesteads and dependants. Most of them a r e  30-year 
olds, and average a standard s i x  education. A t  best ,  they speak broken English. On 
an average, they would have l e f t  school i n  1967 f o r  economic reasons and t r i e d  t o  
make t h e i r  way i n t o  Durban's indus t r i a l  l i f e .  On an average, again, it would have 
taken them about f i v e  years t o  enter  manufacturing employment. Mthethwa worked a s  a 
domestic worker before he got  a job with Durban Engineering. In  1973, most of them 
flooded the  s t r e e t s  of Durban i n  the s t r i k e  wave which was t o  be the impetus f o r  
trade unionism i n  the area  and i n  South Africa. Most of them were locked i n  b i t t e r  
disputes with managements, and, although t rade  union members s ince  the  ear ly  t o  
mid-sixties, they managed t o  entrench t h e i r  power only i n  the 1980s. By the 
mid-1970s they were t o  carry two c y g s :  a union card and an Inkatha card. By the 
1980s they a r e  a l l  l o s t  t o  Inkatha. 
A s  a newly proletarianized labour force,  they brought t o  the c i t y  t h e i r  
own h i s to r i ca l  legacies and memories. For example, l e t  us look a t  one shop-steward, 
Nyambose: h i s  grandfathers were s e t t l e d  near Eshowe i n  lands t h a t  were given t o  
them f o r  t h e i r  achievements i n  mi l i tary  campaigns of the 19th century. Yet t h e i r  
clan was more concentrated near Empangeni. Their land near Eshowe was seized as  
p a r t  of the  northward coas ta l  expansion of white farming. But the  1906/7 rebell ion 
stopped the  owner from coming t o  s e t t l e .  Afterwards, the owner came, and apparently 
he was such a d e r e l i c t  man t h a t  he did not  know what t o  do with it. He sold it t o  a 
M r  Lindhurst (pseudonym) who i n  turn demanded labour from the Nyambose people; he 
a l so  demanded t h a t  t h e i r  c a t t l e  be removed from the land. They decided t o  migrate 
back t o  t h e i r  c l an ' s  place near Empangeni and ask for land from the chief  there. 
They l e f t  behind two of t h e i r  sons t o  earn wages. They were well received by t h e i r  
clansmen. 
Nyambose's ac tual  grandfather was one of those l e f t  behind, who worked on 
the  farm t ry ing f o r  mixed farming, f o r  tobacco and cotton, u n t i l  they s e t t l e d  f o r  
sugarcane. He worked there  most of h i s  l i f e  and became an induna, supervising other 
people - who were recrui ted  from Hlabisa and Ingavwna. The s tory  goes t h a t  they 
k i l l ed  him through bewitching him: he ran away; he went t o  Iscor and died there of 
an accident. 
In  1959 Nyambose's fa ther  was dismissed from the docks i n  Durban f o r  
taking p a r t  i n  stoppages. He was employed i n  1944, together with o thers  from h i s  
area,  including Izinduna, t o  replace workers who were involved with Phungulals 
organization i n  the Durban docks. He was brought t o  the Point Barracks a s  p a r t  of a 
conscious e f f o r t  t o  d ivers i fy  employment and stop worker self-organization i n  
Durban. People from Ixopo were pa r t i cu la r ly  victimized. There, i n  the  barracks, 
apart  from par t ic ipat ing i n  a cul ture  of drinking, dancing, singing and working 
hard, they s t a r t e d  organizing themselves once more. He became one of "Luthuli 's 
men" i n  1959. But, dismissed, he went back home and sought work a t  M r  Lindhurst 's 
sugar plantat ion,  where h i s  f a the r  worked. The old man w a s  very pleased t o  see him 
and made him i n t o  an overseer. But he was seen, allegedly by black policemen, 
v i s i t i n g  Luthuli 's  house i n  Stanger. The farmer was informed, and f i r e d  him on the 
pretext  of s t ea l ing  wood. He died i n  1964 of tuberculosis, but before t h a t  he had 
become a drunken menace i n  the homestead. 
Nyambose, a s  a young man, was appalled by h i s  f a t h e r ' s  drinking habits:  
he has not touched alcohol, and instead devoted himself t o  the  Methodist church and 
the "scripturesu.  But it was h i s  turn  t o  earn money, so  he s t a r t e d  h i s  sojourns i n  
Durban. From then on h i s  p r o f i l e  is l i k e  t h a t  of the others: by 1974 a union 
member, by 1977 an Inkatha member, by the  1980s a lapsed Inkatha member. 
Inkatha's leadership argues that, as a cultural and political movement, it is the 
inheritor, protector and carrier of the pride of the Zulu nation and people. Its 
leadership's rhetoric is saturated with historical reference, analogy and prowess. 
These historical connections in all their complexity are utilized not only to 
inspire popular support but also to bestow on the leadershiq41egitimate authority: 
they become heirs in a long line of political craftmanship. 
There are three pillars that support Inkatha's ideological panorama: the 
first is its linkage with the Shakan revolution which founded the Zulu "nation" - a 
nation which was subordinated by imperial colonists but whose spirit has remained 
unbroken. Buthelezi is seen to be a leader who, like Luthuli in the 1950s, has 
inherited the fprit of Shaka and who, like Shaka, dreams of a broader pan-South 
African unity. A great emphasis is placed within Inkatha on the celebrations of 
Shaka's Day. Secondly, Inkatha is seen to be the continuation of Luthuli's ANC, the 
real ANC, as opposed to the "ANC mission-in-exilett, and to that effect it continues 
to mobilize for a peaceful struggle for black rights, with all the symbols and 
flags. Thirdly, it is a cultural organization that embodies and preserves the Zulu 
people's way of life, of moral and social conduct: and, as such, it is concerned 
with moral discipline, with uhlaphanisa - the obedience of youth to their elders and 
the presfvation of patriarchy and respect. These pillars, according to Bonginkosi 
Nzimanda , converge to create Inkatha's school syllabi, propagated through KwaZulu 
education departments. 
Furthermore, Nzimande challenges COSATU's cultural activists by asking a 
vaxed question: If these are the constituents of "abantu bathoIt, of the politico- 
cultural ideology of the Zulu movement, can they provide for alternatives? Is it 
possible to construct or to forge any convincing alternative, any counter-hegemonic 
project in Natal? Any answer has to tread carefully through issues of the ftnation", 
"ethnicity1', uculture" and "class", because over and above its scholarly or academic 
merit it concerns the plight of self-definition, identity and confidence for every 
carrier of a COSATU card in Natal and beyond. 
COSATU1s Cultural Co-ordinator and oral poet, Hlatshwayo, argues that 
Inkatha's pillars are ltpropagandaIt, an "invention of a tradition1' but a powerful one 
as such, because it is based on a real but distorted history. "... you can't ignore 
history. It is powerful because it did take place and it lives within the people 
. . . l t  And, by focussing on the preoccupations of an ordinary worker, he argues that 
the gravitational pull of such "propaganda1' is being torn apart by novel historical 
currents: "I want to be a man. A proper man. I want to respect my chief. X want 
others to respect me. But there are opposite forces fighting inside of me. On the 
one hand I am an organised worker, on the other I am a captive of this Zulu 
propaganda. Despite my respect for these figureheads I am practically challenged by 
the forces of revolution in the townships, I am surrounded by conflict, and the 
capitalist system is hammering me, I am being knocked in, I am harassed ... then the 
chiefs are doing nothing about my situation ... they drive big cars and demand total 
obedience and the children are saying that all this respect is fokall. The whole 
thing is being torn apart ...lf Yet he admits that "we do not have any alternative, 
another invention. We are not saying, No man, forget about Shaka we are giving you 
this instead. We are creating a different type of movement which is developing 
through this crisis, as the forces of revolution are tearing things up.t' Their duty 
is Ifto struggle to transform the ways people look at it. You have to start from 
where people are and go with them where they take you. I mean if you are thfyst in 
this struggle then you have to engage in people's social views and visions." Such 
a struggle and such an engagement are also novel: it is a departure from deep- 
seated convictions about nationalism and class organization in the region. 
In Natal's labour movement the issue had been pre-decided early on in the 
development of trade unions. It was formulated as a response to pro-Inkatha 
arguments pioneered by the mercurial lawyer and listed communist Rowley Arenstein 
and as a response to pro-SACTU activists in South Africa. For Arenstein, it was and 
is impossible to construct an alternative hegemony in Natal - that is, a national or 
cultural projefb that is not simultaneously a Zulu movement for self- 
determination. Following closely Stalin's definition of the "national question", 
he argues that the Zulu people, sharing a common history, a common cultural lineage 
and a cfpon language, constitute a necessary regional pillar for a new South 
Africa. On the basis of this he argues it is imperative for socialists to align 
themselves with Inkatha; furthermore, the rapid development of the economy, of the 
productive forces in South Africa, has created objective opportunities for change - 
part of this is the development of a stable black working class in industry, but it 
extends to disaffected sectors of the entire society, including South Africa's 
bourgeoisie. For him, socialism is not on the current historical agenda - the 
material interests forcing forward the overthrow of Apartheid and the strength of 
the Apartheid state militate against it; rather, "on the basis of Marxist analysis 
a concrete situation is to be found in the establishment of a bavgeois democratic 
republic with safeguards for minorities and welfare provisions" , and this can be 
achievegi despite the ANCts road of violence, through llnegotiation and peaceful 
means". It is only then that such a bourgeois republic will liberate the forces 
of production to create the real pre-conditions for socialism. 
Trade unionists in Natal have argued the ltobverself o Arenstein1s 
position, but did so by accepting his fundamental premise: that the development of 
the productive forces, or the '60s fleconomic growthw or changes in the labour 
process, has cs~ated the conditions for strong grassroots organization at the point 
of production. They also concurred that socialism was not on the historical 
agenda and agreed that the state was too strong for confrontation - rather, a long, 
protracted struggle became necessary where slowly a strong, democratic labour 
movement had to be built, starting from the shopfloor. It also had to abstain in 
the interim from politics and treasure its independence. This was necessary for two 
reasons: that Inkathats nationalism in Natal exercised a remarkable degree of 
authority over workers and to align oneself with that would be lethal - national 
movements shared one characteristic, their non-class nature and ideology. Whether 
this was a result of the survival of pre-capitalist formations, or an invention of 
petty bourgeoisies, was not important. What was important was the experience of 
trade unionism in the 1950s: SACTU, by subordinating its independence to the 
national campaigns of the Congress Alliance, failed to advance the organization of 
black workers in South Africa, and abdicated its class goals for a populist 
ideology. 
Of course, by the late 1970s this, essentially tactical, argument was 
being confused with a more principled one, inside and outside FOSATU. For example, 
SAAWU in Natal began organizing by attacking FOSATU for not recognizing that a black 
worker did not only exist at the point of production: he was also a member of the 
community. As a member of the black comm~nity~~Sam Kikine argued, any black worker 
was also a member of a black oppressed nation. He ventured also to argue that it 
was this failure in FOSATU1s vision that was making it decline in Natal as against 
SAAWU1s robust growth. In short, in Natal there has been a constant reference to 
"nation", "ethnicity", and so ~n,~fihose uncontestable "givensI1 in social life which 
are becoming like a new ontology. And alongside that there has been an either/or: 
either one sees "Z~lu-ness~~ as a genuine national sentiment or as a product of 
Apartheid-induced false consciousness. What is common in most accounts is that all 
these non-class sentiments are of one hue: they CO-exist alongside the class order 
of society and exercise an independent pressure on social outcomes. It is important 
to examine this in more detail. 
To start, then: the feeling of ltnationhoodtf or "ethnicity", the commonality of 
national sentiments amongst peo~he, is experienced (to echo Benedict Anderson) as a 
"deep, horizontal comradeshiplf. We are aware of the phenomenon: despite actual 
inequalities, status distinctions, stratification and downright exploitation that 
might prevail in a society, people experience and articulate sentiments, beliefs, 
and act in ways that reflect such tfcomradeshipsll. These sentiments cut across 
classes and have no necessary class connotation. At one level, then, nationalism 
and ethnicity are similar in so far as they both contain such horizontal 
identifications. Yet, for our purposes, nationalism shall denote identifications 
which extend to bind peopletogether under a state's territorial sway; and ethnicity 
shall denote any regional identification which has in most cases its origins in pre- 
colonial societies. 
Africanist scholarship has traced adequately the ways in which the early 
exponents of colonial nationalisms set about mobilizing people and constructing 
national identitiess6 These tflonely bilingual intelligentsias, unattached to sturdy 
local  bourgeoisie^^^ , created the first waves of protest in the continent. We are 
aware, too, that the movement for African nationalism in South Africa shared similar 
origins and actions in2jts plight for incorporation into the political life of the 
Union of South Africa. We are also aware, though, that after the ANC shunned its 
elitist orientations in the 1940s it revitalized itself: it gained a mass base in 
its pursuit of a popular democras&c programme of struggle for the achievement of 
political rights in the country. Furthermore, the ANC bound together the 
destinies of black worker and intellectual professional and trader, etc, in a 
tradition of resistance against Apartheid. 29 
For the black working population in Natal, the Congreas legacy was not 
extinguished when the ANC was outlawed, when the South African Congress of Trade 
Unions was dismantled in the 1960s and all opposition to Apartheid repressed. It 
simply lost its coherence. For the 1960s and a good part of the 1970s it was driven 
into quiescence by intimidation and fear. But it remained, nurtured by individuals 
here, groups there, in the midst of an expanding economy. Some of its symbols, 
songs and slogans were appropriated by Inkatha from the mid-seventies onwards. 
Nevertheless, Davies and O'Meara are correct that the local working class is not 
some g9collective tabula rasa" on whose back are inscribed the insignia of 
organization. But, at the same time, we also have somehow to explain our own 
nightmares: that, over and above exploitation in the factories and oppression as a 
black majority, worker experience adds another complication: at the moment, in 
Natal/Kwazulu there is a sense of belonging amongst black poeple, based on their 
lfZulu-nessfs. We all concur on the phenomenon but differ in our explanations of how 
this ethnic ideology has become both dominant and, for multitudes of workers, 
compelling. 
Whatever this ideology and the people it spins around it share, and the 
actions that flow from it entail, whatever the status we accord it - whether a Zulu 
nationalism or ethnicity, tribalism, or regional populism - our modern theories tell 
us that it was "interpellatedff. In other words, we are ready to accord a peculiar 
degree of autonomy to ideological discourses so that those who are formed through 
them can, despite class or status, share a common identity. 
This lrinterpellationM, or the formation of Zulu t~subjects~~ and 
'tidentitiesll, has a two-fold springboard of operation (and here I am being sketchy). 
Firstly, Ifadministrative fiat": after the subjugation of the Zulu kingdom, the 
colonial powers defined both a category and a territory of nZulu-nesslt and squeezed 
individuals inside them. This also involved individuals, homesteads and chiefdoms 
whi~h,~i)n some cases, did not even belong to the Zulu kingdom in pre-colonial 
times. This policy and practice ~pntinued and was perfected throughout the last 
century from Shepstone to Koornhof. 
Secondly, by black petty-bourgeois invention and l1imaginings": since the 
1920s and the 1930s urban and rural petty-bourgeoisies, with differing intensities 
and responding to, and on the basis of, the abovementioned colonial interpellation, 
mobilized people in the area as vZuluft, forging in the process those deep and 
horizontal comradeships of an imagined nation. 
For example, Neville Alexander argues eloquently the first case: "in 
order to justify these policies (of oppression and exploitation over the black 
majority) the ideology of racism was elaborated, systematized and universalized. 
They (the people of South Africa) grew up believing that they were 'whites1, 
'colouredsl, 'africans', 'indians'. Since 1948, they have been encouraged and often 
forced to think of themselves in even more microscopic term~,~3s 'Xhosa', 'Zulu', 
'Malay8, 'Muslim1, 'Hindu', 'Griqua', "Sothot, 'Vendat, etc." These categories, 
together with the physical creation of Bantustans, allows for the easy flow of the 
second abovementioned argument. For example, G Mare has argyed that Inkatha's 
populism is a resonant, ethnic interpellation (using non-class elements) which is 
articulated by a petty bourgegpie on the basis of homeland policy and its location 
within the Kwazulu Bantustan. In short, 8fZulu-ness" was extruded through a 
double-sided historical press-mill: on top, the rulers' ideology; nearer the 
bottom, black petty bourgeois strivings. As a product, we evidence these days the 
magnetic pull of a submerged Zulu nation and an ethnic mobilization - Inkatha - as 
its basis. 
There is much that I share here: of course, in the post-1948 period, with 
the ripening of homeland policy and with Bantustan creation underway, a physical 
coherence is given to Zulu imaginings and horizons. This carving out of territories 
and the creation of homeland structures &&.g. Tribal Authorities) is the backbone of 
what Mare denotes as Inkatha's populism. Furthermore, Mare goes on'to analyse the 
conditions that create black people's availability to such discourses. What is of 
worry, though, is a small point of dissonance that has very serious politico- 
cultural implications: the wholesale acceptance of theories of ideology which treat 
subject-formation and popular identities as a resultant of structural 
"interpellations" - a course pioneered by Louis Althusser and creatively extended by 
Ernesto Laclau. These theories, influential as they are, leave little space for 
active38ppropriations of tradition by ordinary people, as shall be elaborated 
below. Shula Marks's recent collection of essays asserts such an appropriation, 
yet it is methodologically difficult to see how: her concern with "agencyv and 
ordinary peog&e leads her to castigate structuralism's elimination of the subjective 
from history , yet in the same stride she uses Laclau (whose raison,dtetre is such 
an elimination) to explain Zulu-based "ethnic nationali~rn'~ in ~atal."' The 
following pages are an attempt to redress this small worry, which leads through a 
critical assessment of Laclau, Benedict Anderson, and ends with a need to overhaul 
our "press-mill" idea of Zulu-ness. 
V Laclau, Anderson and Cultural Formations 
The quarrel I would have with historical materialists who address themselves to the 
issues of ideology and phenomena like populism or non-class comradeships, especially 
influenced by Laclau or Benedict Anderson, is three-fold: firstly, it is vital to 
separate "subject-formationf1 from ideological interpellations; the implication of 
this is that ordinary people can, through their own institutions (whether they 
manifest "adjustmentsw or "resistance1' to the flsysteml'), regulate *'subject- 
formatiog; despite dominant ideologies. Structuralist theories, Ernesto Laclau's 
included , collapse subject-formation to being no more than the result or the 
outcome of ideological interpellations; by implication, oppositional cultures are 
the effects of contradictions in the structures of social formations and cannot be 
seen to arise from people's attempts to control their conditions of life. 
Secondly, it is necessary to resist interpretations of "Zulu-ness" which 
treat it as a populist experience "interpellated" from l'above" by either dominant 
ideologies and/or petty bourgeois imaginings. Rather, 1'Zulu-nesst2 must be viewed as 
a negotiated identity between ordinary people's attempts to create effective and 
reciprocal social bonds (or functioning cultural formations) out of their social and 
material conditions of life and political ideologies that seek to mobilize them in 
non-class ways. Both the former and the latter set for each other strict limits of 
operation. 
Thirdly, despite the non-class elements utilized, the myth-complexes that 
are generated, the identities that are produced, the common experience of a black 
oppressed majority, the nature of the abovementioned "negotiation" is constrained by 
class determination. Once these are clarified below, the argument here can be 
released to (a) show in which ways the black working class bears its own traditions, 
heritage and ideologies - how, in short, it is not a "tabula rasaw - and (b) explode 
the mythology of an all-encompassing l'Zulu-nesstl which verges on becoming an 
ontological argument in Natal. (For a more detailed critique of Laclau, see 
Appendix A. )  
Fourthly, a central problem in Laclauls theory is its abstract vagueness: 
authoritarian populisms could be assumed to be involved in popular-democratic 
struggles; any appeal to the "peoplew, whatever its form, against whatever 
power-bloc, could be seen to be of the same social value, and so on. But, more 
importantly, the organizational form that underpins Iqintegellationslq of the 
qfpeopletl can be elided. As Davies and OqMeara have noted , there is a great 
difference between a populism that effaces class contradictions and qqpopular- 
democratictq organization that insists on class alliances. But, furthermore, within 
the latter historic blocs, there is a great difference between popular-democratic 
alliances which involve the presence of the working class in an organized form as 
against political fronts which assume the presence of the class, in an amorphous 
way, as part of the flpeople" - by definition. Each, I would argue, would generate 
its own unique interpellations, even when discursive elements involved are 
irreducible to class. 
In short, Laclauls innovation in the theory of ideology40, despite its 
impact on historical materialists in South Africa and despite its effects through 
transmission belts from the academy to popular organizations, has serious 
implications. It started as an explanation of why working-class struggles and 
ideologies link up with national or populist projects - which, at the time, was 
innovative. But now it has been turned upside down: it provides people with an 
assumption which guarantees behind all nqnon-class interpellationsI1 a class presence 
(in the final instance, after all, they are all overdetermined by class struggle). 
If such a presence can be assumed, then illmatters little what organizational form 
it takes. His theory, however compelling , fails to provide us with the necessary 
anchors to distinguish between authoritarian forms of populism, democratic class 
alliances, poor people's movements, etc, in which discourses one can find elements 
of no necessary class connotation. There is no one nationalism, populism or 
ethnicity; there are varieties and each one of them brings with it.a host of 
implications. 
It is to the variety of suc~2politico-cultural experiences that Benedict 
Andersonqs book, Imagined Communities , pays homage. His discussion of the origins 
of discrete forms of nationalism has opened up a new space for the discussion of 
contemporary movements and their tqimaginingsl*. In the context of Africa and Asia, 
feelings of national brotherhood and comradeship are shown to be creative constructs 
and imaginings of Itsmall reefs", of "literate" and wbilingualll intelligentsias (i.e. 
intellectuals and professionals). Unlike @her national movements, they are 
Itunattached to sturdy local bourgeoisiesw. These oppressed but privileged petty 
bourgeoisies crafted the imaginings of submerged and dominated nations to usher a 
period of decolonization on to the historical terrain. Nevertheless, such . 
imaginings became possible through the development of certain socio-cultural 
pre-conditions: the rise of print capitalism, the decline of world religious 
empires and different apprehensions of time - these created the first models. But 
in the case of formations dominated by imperial powers, discriminatory practices 
against these lqcreolelf groups, together with the careless carving of new boundaries 
for colonial administration, completed the backdrop. For example, Tim Couzensls 
biography of H I E Dhlomo and the latter's volume of collected writings capture in 
an amicable way thedmotive depths and imaginative leaps that come to construct a 
national sentiment. This moving linkage of a people to a history, a territory and 
a destiny generates deep resonances, strong self-identifications and solidarities, 
which are irreducible to class. 
But here, as in Laclaufs case, Anderson - although constantly hinting at 
popular identifications from - mainly concentrates on the imaginings of 
these tiny literate reefs and the models of nationhood they interpellate from 
tlabovelq. He fails to show how these horizontal comradeships, articulated by 
contemporary non-class movements, are absorbed by the lives and take root in the 
affairs of those tlbeloww. That is, the rise of models of nationhood and ethnicity 
initiated by literate leaderships - who imagine the nation and mobilize for its 
territorial carving - fails to explain one crucial component: the passion for these 
comradeships of a ltmovementtt, a "nationIq, amongst ncm- or semi-literate multitudes 
of people. His concentration on scripted signs ignores that these solidarities are 
constructed from "sounds": this construction takes place in the public and oral 
world of mass movements which are dominated by rituals of solidarity embedded in 
popular cultures and symbolic spectacles of mass power. In short, in the din of 
this construction we find the performance rituals of solidarity embedded in ordinary 
people's cultural formations. Any cursory experience of popular gatherings in Natal 
- from Inkatha's to COSATU1s - betrays a tension: there is always a process of 
*linterpellationlf descending on the crowds from the platforms, like rain, yet there 
is also the homology between the rhetoric of grassroots leaders, the izimbongi 
incantations, the impromptu prayers, the songs and other cultural practices which 
rise from the crowds upwards to flood the platforms. As J Cronin states, "the oral 
arts are alive and strugging for their freedom in South Afkica ..lf , in the 
context of mass meetings. Movements generate collectivities by appropriating this 
popular culture from "below" and construct identities and solidarities through 
popular rhythms, sounds and "words of firew. 
But, in the discourses of movements, from "above" as it were, one can 
register their organizations1 priorities, and their libertarian content: one needs 
to distinguish between "interpellati~ns~~ that are communitarian and those that rely 
on political mythology to justify leaderships and directions. To make this 
distinction, it is necessary to discuss sketchily the social role of 'Qnyth~logies~~. 
Wyths~~, states V Turner, "treat of origins but derive from 
transitions..." - in other words, they are narrated in anxious, "liminal" moments, 
during crucial "rites of passage" in order to preserve and recreate common 
identities. And, he continues: '*myths relate how one state of affairs becomes 
another; how an unpeopled world becomes populated, how chaos becomes cosmos; how 
immortals become mortals; how the seasons come to replace a climate without 
seasons; &ow the original unity 89 mankind became a plurality of tribes and 
creation" , and so on. Godelier insists that myths were in pre-class societies 
what ideology becomes in class society: they legitimate a social order, naturalize 
its inequalities, and they ~stify the majority by consoling it, by effacing or 
eliminating contradictions. Political mythologies, though, emerge in the 
transitions fr2g clan to class societies and continue thereafter: thus, the nlearlyll 
forms of state generate the first political mythologies of worigins'l, to 
legitimize the right of rulers to rule, to empower the ruling strata, and 
simultaneously to create collective subjects. Such mythologies are effective if 
they manage to link proto-communities with shared meanings, rites of passage, forms 
of symbolism, a sense of a common past with a myth of a fouuding community - an 
origin. 
It becomes possible, theg6 to register differences between populist and 
popular democratic interpellations : the former appeals to black people in South 
Africa through a political *qmythomoteurn - it always, apart from effacing class 
contradictions, legitimates its leaderst rights to rule through the establishment of 
a political mythology of origins. This, furthermore, does not challenge existing 
cultural formations - ratherslit leaves them intact. For example, Inkatha, whatever 
its original intentions were , legitimates both its leadership style and its 
popular mission through such a founding mythology: the Shakan revolution which 
constituted the Zulu nation. All its subjects are available for its call no matter 
what they do, how they behave and what classes they come from. They were bequeathed 
to Inkatha to be led fortyd, and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi is its natural leader 
through chiefly lineage. This is over and above the norm, an authoritarian 
populism. As long as the complex forms of kinship and ritual in ordinary people's 
cultural formations (rural or urban) find a home in a movement like Inkatha, and in 
so far as the latter preserves a special place for their ways of life and practices, 
they are available for ethnic identification; they, in turn, gain without effort a 
political past and a destiny. Such populism can lose its axiomatic grip if, for 
instance, it banned Christian beliefs or declared education and the scripted sign as 
a non-Zulu phenomenon, or it went around whipping husbands for ruling over their 
wives, and so on: such challenges to existing cultural formation would undermine 
it. Because, finally, it subsists on the destinies of people carved out on an 
ethnic space by the Apartheid state, it is also an ethnic movement despite protests 
from its central committee. 
In contradistinction, popular democratic interpellations are incapable of 
producing such a political founding mythology. Either they have to resort to an 
absurd pluralism of many ethnic units with their own political mythologies of 
origin, each one equal to the others, brought together as a multi-ethnic, poly- 
colour alliance, or they have to found their interpellating mechanisms on a moment 
of general dispossession and on common attempts in struggle to forge a common 
destiny. The leadership's mandate comes from an actual historical social contract 
with the people - the first Smconference, Kliptown, 1955, etc - and the 
relationship between people is a levelling one and a communitarian rhetoric 
prevails. In this instance, appropriations of cultural formations are, by 
necessity, transformative. In the first case, as in the case of Inkatha, movements 
need not engage in struggles on a mass basis against power-blocs; for the latter, 
common identities can be formed only through common struggles. In the former, 
political mythologies are crucial, whereas in the latter they are ambiguous. In 
both, political subjectivities are not interpellated from llabovew alone. 
Finally, what is the relationship of I9class determinationt9 in this world 
of non-class interpellations? There is no doubt that those 11interpellations19 are 
shared by more than the black working class, Similarly, there is no doubt that 
cultural formations are not exclusive to classes; furthermore, that cultural 
practices are common, without any "necessary" class contents. How, then, do we 
persist with the issue of class? ttClass determinationtf, one's existence, in other 
words, as a worker, is not only lldefinitionaltf, ltheoreticalw, etc, it sets limits 
to the ways of life possible and available to people. Workers exist in a world of 
pressures that make available some institutions in society but at the same time 
d u d e  them from many parts. Furthermore, their lives are divided into two neat 
parts: a world of work in which they are supposed to abdicate their productive 
power to others and subordinate themselves to the social and technical dictates of 
production demands; and a leisure time where they are supposed to regenerate 
themselves and/or occupy themselves as they wish. In South Africa, the latter is 
further constrained through racial controls and poor substructures for survival. 
Your class determination is carried over into your everyday life as. "fatew, with 
unique pressures that provide little space for creativity or cultural practice. In 
short, you are shaped into a way of life by virtue of your class location. But 
workers do not "adjusttf to systems of dominant interpellations; rather, as I have 
shown elsewhere, they react by forming "def sive  combination^^^ from which spring up 
~tproto-communities19 or cultural formations. g9 And, within these, the issue of 
control over conditions of life and subjectivities is of paramount importance. It 
is on the basis of these that cultural practices proliferate which generate both 
adjustments to dominant interpellations and resistance. In Natal, these cultural 
formations have generated a very vibrant tradition of practices and performances, 
primarily oral, which cannot be seen simply as an imposed culture of adjustment. 
Black workersg in Natal do not perceive the category 19Zulu1p as an . 
invention of divide-and-rule. Rather, they see it as an outcome of the Shakan 
revolution which created a kingdom and a powerful state based on the common identity 
of many clans and chiefships. They all accept its historical importance and derive 
dignity, pride and coherence out of it. But this does not mean that they all accept 
Inkathats definition of it, nor do they attach to it the same social and political 
significance. At the most general level, all accept that they are "children of the 
reedw, they share similar allegiances to ancestral lines, similarities in custom, 
familial prohibitions, and similar hardships in the struggle to preserve the 
functioning of a homestead economy or an urban household. 
They all understand that there is some lnsocial bondt1 knotting them 
together; this they understand as their wZulu-ness". But there are different 
modalities of this ttZulu-nessqf subsisting on different working-class formations. 
The following section argues that there is no f9Zulu-ness91 held in common by all 
black workers in Natal, despite the fact that most of them identify themselves as 
19Zulu**. The appropriation of this ethnicity by black workers is related to their 
varied forms of historic experience. Indeed, if one reassembles the experiential 
memories of ordinaxy black workers in Natal on the broadest possible terms, i.e. 
their relationship to land, dispossession, proletarianization and chiefships, one 
notes the springing up of heterogeneous clusters of meanings and traditions of 
resistance. In selecting from the contemporary labour movement a stratum of 
leadership which is known for its oral power and symbolic "brokerage" all over 
Natal, in tracing the residues of traditions that have informed their values and 
ideologies, one can demonstrate sufficient evidence. It will also permit some 
statement on the issues of the "real ions and ideologiesw that make the local 
proletariat anything but a "tabula rasaIf. 
VI. Four Traditions of resistance 
I shall argue here, however sketchily and provisionally, that "Z~lu-ness~~ is by no 
means a common univocal or unilateral experience in Natal/KwaZulu. I shall do this 
by selecting four examples of different appropriations of this sense of horizontal 
comradeship. At the broadest level, we can distinguish between four main traditions 
of resistance in Natal, which imply by their existence a different experience of 
being Zulu: the black workers of Howick/Mpophomeni; the black workers of the Lower 
Umfolozi (e.g. Empangeni/Richards Bay area); black workers in Durban; and, 
finally, those on the margins - the Pondo and Zulu in the shack worlds of Umbumbulu. 
Black workers from the Howick/Mpophomeni areas and further afield in Lions 
River and the peri-urban areas that surround them understand themselves as ltZuluM. 
But this identity is perceived by them in terms of linguistic and cultural 
characteristics. Socio-politically, though, they see themselves as part of a 
broader, dispossessed African nation. To identify oneself as a political Zulu 
subject would be divisive and would serve no purpose. Although they would have no 
problem in being characterized as Zulu people, they are unavailable to political, 
non-class interpellations on an ethnic basis. For this, they are impeggious to 
Inkatha1s mobilizing drives, despite early membership of many of them. 
What makes them available to imaginings that take them to feel as part of 
a broader African nation are their concrete experiences of land alienation: they 
imagine many proto-communities like theirs, throughout South Africa, who share with 
them a horizontal sense of solidarity. In their cultural formations, despite 
rituals in every-day life similar to many other communities in Natal, they have no 
space for political mythologies of common origin. What makes them different is 
their specific past and volatile present. 
Here, they share a common history of two major dispossessiolls: popular 
memory speaks of them as dispossessed "labour-tenants1! from white farms or 
dispossessed agrarian wage-labourers. Most of them came from agrarian families who 
were dispossessed once before by white colonists and settlers and made into "labour 
tenantsu on white farms. The area has real linkages with the Bambatha rebellion and 
the ICU agitation on white farms in the 1920s. By the time of their fathers, a slow 
but persistent process of proletarianization had already begun; it was a process 
that made them into wage-labourers on the farms, or edged them out towards contract 
work at Howick or Johannesburg. But, although by the 1970s most of them were 
landless, the land question haunts them, concentrated as they are in urban villages 
to serve the labour needs of Howick, Mooi River and Nottingham Road. Their rituals 
of mutuality are deeply rooted in an agrarian culture mediated by Christianity. 
As wage labourers, as people churned out of land relations, they were also 
faced with more urban evictions. Some of them were relocated three times: from a 
growing slum-yard world of Howick to a township (Zenzele), they were finally removed 
to Mpophomeni in order to make space for expansion of Midmar Dam, to serve white 
agriculture better. In all this history their relationship to chiefship had been 
broken, and existed in most cases for instrumental reasons: many who wanted land 
for their cattle after the abolition of labour-tenancy sought out age-old 
allegiances to chiefs in the Impendle region. 
Furthermore, they made themselves available to both labour and political 
organization, with stubborn consistency, since the 1950s - which consolidated their 
identity of being a dispossessed part of an African nation and workers exploited in 
the factory. Moses Mabheda and Harry Gwala were their organizers then, and managed 
to link agrarian grievances, like the dipping and culling of cattle, which were 
affecting "labour tenantstf (in many cases, they were the workerst own kin), and 
industrial issues through trade unionism. They were part and parcel of all the late 
1950s' campaigns. Their proletarianization, their class determinations and their 
regional dynamics have shaped them into a unique tradition of resistance in Natal: 
the Ifland questionu, "white domination1', "worker rights" have a unique resonance 
there. 
But there are marked differences between them and black workers in the 
Richards Bay/Empangeni areas: they, too, understand themselves as lqZulu'' but their 
llZulu-nessl'.has its own modalities. They understand themselves to be a separate and 
a distinctive people: they are tied together by a common culture and a prior 
political community (state) which was destroyed by imperialism; they strongly 
believe that the Zulu nation needs its own territory and a government that 
represents them; their political unity is mediated through chiefs and they are 
available to Inkatha's non-class interpellations. In fact, the majority of them are 
members. They join trade unions readily but trade unionism looks after people's 
necessities at work, whereas Inkatha looks after their community needs. 
For the majority, dispossession has not occurred as it has in the 
Midlands. Most still enjoy access to land, which, however overcrowded and 
underdeveloped, is still a meaningful component of their lives and those of their 
kin. Chiefship - and its relationship to headmen, and headmen's relationship to 
heads of commoner homesteads - is still a functioning social system with reciprocal 
duties and obligations. 
Their proletarianization has occurred slower over time, with migrancy 
playing a dominant role in the lives of homesteads. Large tracts of land around 
Ingavuma, Empangmiand Lower Umfolozi have remained intact: that is, although 
ravaged by war and poverty, popular memory ties specific localities to experiences 
that go back three generations. A lot of them were co~goned-off for the sugar 
plantations to work at cutting cane for minimal wages. Others were cordoned-off 
for the coal-mines further inland at Hlobane, Vryheid, and Dundee.. Both experiences 
have created an aversion to that kind of work, and, as places of drudgery, they were 
avoided as far as possible. In Mahlabathini, for example, one can witness a gradual 
transition from the time of the grandfathers, who only entered short-term contracts 
(3-6 months), to the time of the fathers, who started proper oscillating migration 
to the Witwatersrand accompanied by izinduna to work for firms like Iscor, etc. By 
the 1960s and 1970s, as these processes continued, the rise of industries in the 
border areas like Isithebe and Richards Bay had absorbed people who were becoming 
permanently proletarianized. Indeed, as the urbanization of border areas indicates, 
and the concentrations of townships in and around the Lower Umfolozi area betray, 
this process of total proletarianization has been accelerating. 
For white management, it is the "story of the conversion of unhealthy, 
illiterate, undernourished, tribalized and superstitious Black people into skilled 
industrial workers ... This achievement was realised in less than five years - 
starting from scratch.If And this process has been achieved thought co-operation of 
the royal house, chiefs, and the KwaZulu homeland structures: Ifwe organise special 
functions in the King's room. We lay on good food, drinks, music, we invite the Zulu 
liaison committee; we invite the local chiefs, we invite the press and Radio Bantu 
... of course we dramatise the event and we give the chiefs aportunity to speak ... 
We predict and control human nature to conform to our wish." 
In this area, where the centrality of the homestead remained intact or, in 
cases of total proletarianization, it is seen as reversible in the future, a 
different tradition of resistance has been accumulating, mediated by and in 
opposition, in some cases, to chiefs. Now that cracks are appearing through the 
COSATU and UWUSA conflict, the tradition remains as Inkatha is shunned for violating 
and transgressing unwritten codes of moral behaviour. 
Durban's black working class - the largest in Natal - in contradistinction 
has elements of both traditions outlined above amongst its constituents. But there 
is another which is unique to it by virtue of its urban and industrial 
specificities. Many workers' views are being shaped by segregationist rhetoric: 
that they are a separate and distinct group (from the Amapondo and Indians) and that 
Zulu workers constitute a separate culture. They all agree that this common culture 
had a political, national history which was destroyed by the whites. And many see 
Inkatha as a c u l M  movement that revives a pride in the past which is in danger 
of being destroyed. They have also had a unique pre-history, adjacent to petty 
bourgeoisies - traders and shop-keepers - who, in turn, clashed wi Indian 
interests over attempted monopolies of racially exclusive markets." Their history 
of urban existence, controlled by the Durban system and rigid influx controls, and 
their history of urban slum cultures (Cat0 Manor), of political campaigns (late '50s 
and early '~OS), have not detracted from the Zul self-perceptions which make for 
the kind of tensions I have described elsewhere. go 
These legacies make Durban's proletariat both the most advanced and the 
most backward-looking in the country: the most experienced in organization and 
renewal but the most attached to traditional institutions. This demands a thorough 
review of the tremendous changes experienced in the last twenty years in the 
communities and the factory: changes that have made workers seek, through Inkatha 
and its township cells, a return of the moral authority of the past, of patriarchy 
in the face of collapsing households - yet changes that have opened black workers' 
cultural formations to the most modernist of influences and sub-cultures. 
Finally, the Amapondo in Durban have had a history of marginalization by 
the "Zulurt which spans many years. They see themselves different only in dialect, 
but feel themselves to be part and parcel of a black working population which 
includes Zulu. The latter, though, differentiate themselves culturally; "the 
Mpondos are different, they are stupid, they are good fighters, they take all the 
Ishit' jobs." Some, interestingly though, make themselves available to non-class 
Zulu-based interpellations. Further, many have joined Inkatha, perhaps because 
Inkatha councillors control housing. Nevertheless, the majority of them have a 
different relationship to non-class interpellations. 
Most of them have homesteads in the Transkei and migrancy is their lot: 
some stay in the shack worlds of Inanda or Malukazi, some in rented rooms in the 
main townships and others in hostels or company compounds. Their history of working 
in Natal goes back a century: sugarcane workers who to this day form the majority 
of the agrarian labour force. 
The Pondoland rebellion against llBantuw or "Tribalnt authorities and 
"bettermentIt schemes was remarkable for both its resilience and duration and its 
devastating results: it hastened the immiseration of a large number of homesteads, 
so that an increasing reliance on migrant labour became the order of the day. It 
also drove a wedge between popular experience and chiefs. During the struggles of 
1959-61, the commoners1 Hill Committees came to embody a remarkable degree of 
self-organization, leadership and popular control. Recent interviews point to, 
especially in Flagstaff, more Congress influence than was hitherto imagined. 
But their relationship to their homesteads and the homestead head's 
relationship to chiefs are different from those of migrant workers from northern 
Zululand. These relationships were severed during the Pondoland rebellion, where 
chiefs identified themselves with nfbettermenttt schemes and the Government. 
Chiefship, for most, is now an administrative burden Itdressed upu with ritual. 
"Land has got too small and taxes have gone up. This was the plan of the Government 
in the 1950s. They have taken our land. There is no work and too much tax. Chiefs 
are not for the people, they are working for the government. They tell us what the 
government tells .l1 "The Government, they steal the land. Land is useless 
because of the Government plan. There is fighting now because the chiefs are no 
good any more. The chiefs are traitors of the Pondo people. They are now taking 
the people's possessions, like cattle.I1 6$mongst them, one finds a very crucial 
component of worker leadership in Natal. 
From our oral evidence, it seems that the 1960s were marked by an increase 
of migrations from Pondoland to Durban which, by the 19708, turned into a flood. 
Large areas of Inanda-Bambayi, Amauti and Africa have become catchment areas in the 
north-west of Durban and Umbumbulu in the south. And in these areas shacklords, 
exploiting the scarcity of housing and amenities that Apartheid has generated, have 
been party to the growth of these sprawling concentrations of recently 
proletarianized people. Such people have been migrating from all over KwaZulu and 
Natal: in Umbumbulu, next to the Pondo worker concentrations, one finds people from 
Harding, Ixopo, Polela, and the Underberg. But the latter together with the 
traditional residents, led by local chiefs and homeland leaders, have unleashed a 
movement of ethnic separatism which has turned to violence against Pondo people. 
According to Chief Mkhize and Chief Makhanya, the Pondo people had to go 
because they were taking jobs that really belonged to Zulu people; and, although 
the Zulu people were hospitable during times of economic boom, now, with 
unemployment in the area, Zulu people needed the jobs that were available in 
factories built by the whites on their land without even asking for their 
permission. Pondo workers were also a bad influence because they were against 
Inkatha and they were poisoning the minds of Zulu youth. Now the Zulu people, with 
1tShakat~2bloodf' in their hearts, would be led for reclaiming their land, by their 
chief S. 
In short, there is no one appropriation of wZulu-nessu, nor is there - to 
swing the argument around - one culture of resistance: there are many. 
Conclusion 
The argument, stated so broadly, suffices as a simple demonstration: that 
tlZulu-nesslt, as an ethnic self-identification among black workers in Natal, although 
common, registers different experiences and comradeships from area to area. It is 
the turn of the historians to show whether this differs over time. But it is also 
their turn to enrich further our understanding of local histories, because it is on 
such a local understanding and traditions that labour organizations can engage, with 
 social views and visions", to echo Hlatshwayo, in order to begin providing for a 
resonant alternative to Inkatha's myth complexes. In the process, the delicate 
relationship between the chiefs and commoners, the unwritten record of the Congress 
movement in Natal, of religion, etc, will have to be explored. So far, most 
scholarship in and on Natal has boosted Inkatha's self-confidence as the logical 
heir of Zulu legacies; it is time that it boosted the self-confidence of ordinary 
people. 
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Appendix 
Ernesto Laclau offers historical materialists a general theory of ideology and a 
specific theory of political ideology, viz populism. (1) In both instances, he 
attempts to.argue a llnon-reductionistfl theory of ideology which does not yield its 
power to economic interests or class contradictions. (2) Both facets of his 
argument are important for the discussion of ethnicity or ethnic self-identity in 
South Africa. His general theory runs as follows: the basic function of all 
ideology (of whatever social stratum or class) is to constitute or ftinterpellate" 
individuals as subjects. Ideology is, in other words, a discourse (3) made up 
ofmessages,statements, texts, images and sounds which interpellate or constitute us 
in sets of beliefs, values and norms. As individuals - as these desiring, sexual 
animals of speech, and as these bearers of social structures - we are transformed by 
ideology into specific subjects, or we are "fixed" into particular subjectivities. 
Furthermore, as social individuals, we are the sites for many interpellations which 
are sometimes coherent but often contradictory. Yet, these contradictions emanate 
outside us and despite us: although all social groups and classes are capable of 
generating ideologies, they are, according to Laclau, tfconstrainedl* by the dominant 
contradictions in modes of production and social formations. (4) But, if this is 
the "function" of all ideology, what unifies it into a coherent and systematic 
discourse? 
For Laclau, classes or class contradictions cannot be presupposed as the 
ltunifiers" of ideological discourses, otherwise his theory would be mductionist: 
rather, the unifier is that which it constitutes: "the subject (my emphasis) 
interpellated and thus constituted through this discoursel1. ( 5 )  So, according to 
Laclau, although all ideology interpellates individuals as subjectsi we can 
differentiate between them through inquiring what kind of subject is being 
interpellated. And since this subject is formed through many non-class elements, it 
is pointless to ask a priori which class interpellates. We can only derive or 
decipher class hegemony ( 6 )  by pinpointing the "articulating principle" that 
regulates the modalities of this ltsubject". 
Although, in principle, the departure from reductionism is welcome, it is 
important to drive a wedge between ideological interpellations and subject-formation 
in society: the last decade of struggles within and against institutions in South 
Africa, from the school to the government bureaucracy, from the factory to the 
church, and so on, have taught us that the "wedge" is a prerequisite for any theory 
of ideological struggle. After all, all social institutions generate discursive 
practices or ideologies to the extent that (a) they embody power structures which 
have their own legitimating "mythologies", and (b) they attempt to create, 
construct, inculcate "functional individuals" - i.e. they attempt to create 
subjectivities (and "attemptN is the big word here) that ensure their long-term 
reproduction. In this sense, they all "interpellate" individuals as subjects, and 
they all use non-class elements to do so. But can we assume that these 
interpellations are effective? Within each one there are no guarantees that 
subject-formation is interpellated by institutional ideologies. If institutional 
discourses do not achieve internal coherence, between two institutions contradictory 
~tsubject-intepellations~~ might prevail, and so on. The point is that, in all these 
institutions, interpellation takes place as an attempt at forging functional 
subjects: individuals who perform their lives according to institutional rules and 
who share the value orientations dominant at any particular time. But, however 
much we want to remain "non-reductionist", we have to note that all institutions 
embody power relations and, as sites of power, they embody more than ideological 
interpellations; they all employ disciplinary techniques and controls over their 
populations. Although there might not be a nc~sesarg class connotation in their 
ideologies of power, we cannot deny that at the same time class ideologies might 
proliferate as they are all at close scrutiny, sites of struggle. Nevertheless, the 
main point here is that there is an attempt at subject-formation. 
Looking at "interpellationu this way preserves Laclau's concern with 
non-reductionism: there are no prior guarantees that a class ideology is dominant 
(and what is crucial, even if it is dominant), there are no guarantees that it is 
effective. We can only speak of a dominant ideology if, and only if, the 
legitimating tfmythologieslt which enshrine power in institutions, and the functional 
subjects they seek to construct, are homologous throughout a social formation's 
. important institutions. This presupposes, though, control of or hegemony of 
institutions by power-blocs, strata or classes. If this is the case, we can argue 
the case for dominant ideology which proliferates throughout the social body. 
(Feminists, for example, would argue that rtpatriarchyft is an ideological cornerstone 
of all social institutions.) 
But, even if in principle ideology (or ideologies) does not have a 
necessary class connotation, that does not mean that class connotations are always 
absent: they can even be dominant. (7) Furthermore, a dominant ideology might 
createfunctional individuals through force or sanctions, but it does not necessarily 
form subjects. We can, in the same breath, argue then that, despite Apartheid 
ideology, despite the control of most institutions in ~atal/Kwa~ulu by power-blocs 
that ftinterpellatett African people as Zulu subjects, there is no guarantee that 
their interpellation is formative. Far from it, because within such institutions 
and outside them oppositional cultures are generated, nurtured by ordinary people, 
as they collectively attempt to control their conditions of life. (8) 
As mentioned above, Laclau offers also a theory of political ideology- 
populism: he argues, consistent with his general theory, that ideological elements 
taken in isolation have no necessary class connotation. Over and above class 
contradictions in capitalist society, there is another one of primary importance: 
this contradiction generates political subjectivities, where individuals are 
interpellated as parts of the "peoplew in struggle against power-blocs. He calls 
this the people/power-bloc contradiction and claims that it is dominant in political 
life. It generates and unleashes popular-democratic struggles (only overdetermined 
in the last instance by class contradictions). Therefore, what is identified as 
populism (these appeals to the people against power-blocs) cannot be reduced to 
being simply petty-bourgeois ideologies. Rather, they are common to all classes 
struggling against the powers that be, and their symbolisms and traditions are 
available to all; their class nature cannot be presupposed. Rather than reducing 
it to class interests, its articulating principle should be established through an 




E Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London, 1977). 
Ibid p 99. 
-9 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p 100. 
Ibid p 101. 
-9 
Ibid., p 105. 
I conflate here dominant with hegemonic ideologies, which need to be separated 
if we are discussing competing political projects. For example, Inkatha might 
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